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Book Review
Katherine Franke, Wedlocked: The Perils of Marriage Equality—How African Americans 
and Gays Mistakenly Thought the Right to Marry Would Set Them Free. New York: New 
York University Press, 2015, pp. 288, $35.00 (cloth).
Reviewed by Brian H. Bix
Katherine Franke’s new book, Wedlocked, is part legal history, part reflection 
on legal and social reform. By the time one is done with the subtitle of the 
book, How African Americans and Gays Mistakenly Thought the Right to Marry Would Set 
Them Free, one already has a good sense of the book’s basic thesis and general 
tone. The book juxtaposes1 stories of the liberation of African-Americans 
during and just after the Civil War—emphasizing the access they then gained 
to legal marriage—with the recent movement for legal recognition of same-sex 
marriage.2 Franke admits that she came to this project with a suspicion that the 
second admission to legal marriage would repeat the patterns of the first, but 
ultimately recognized that, at least in some important ways, it has not (5-6, 188, 
197). She explores why this different outcome developed.
The early parts of the book relate horrible reports of what recently liberated 
slaves endured: Family members killed or beaten by former owners, or left 
to die by indifferent government troops and officials. For that group, the 
marriage laws at that time were used not to celebrate and dignify, but to harass, 
intimidate, and oppress (23-50, 117-43). The right to marry became just one 
more mechanism by which African-Americans could be regulated, supervised, 
and, in some cases, imprisoned.3  Some of those instigating prosecutions were 
other African-Americans, former lovers, and abandoned spouses using the 
law to get back at those whom they perceived as having wronged them (163-
81). Franke—a Columbia Law School professor—reasonably sees parallels with 
1. The book is careful to note that it is not “equat[ing] the two . . . . To this end, the book offers 
a juxtaposition rather than an analogy . . .” (11).
2. The book was completed before the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. 
Ct. 2584 (2015) came down. That case held that the Constitution required states to allow 
same-sex couples to marry. In the book, Franke predicted that a decision along those lines 
was probable (193).
3. Franke speculates that the legal harassment had among its primary purposes keeping 
African-Americans from voting and creating cheap convict labor (139-40).
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more recent instances of former members of same-sex couples using the legal 
rules in states hostile to same-sex unions to keep their former partners from 
any contact with children that the couple had been raising together prior to 
the breakup.4 
Wedlocked reminds us of important insights from the critical theory tradition: 
Rights are double-edged—at best—, equality often means meeting someone 
else’s norm, and it may be easier to join an institution than it is to change it.5 
And backlash is inevitable when groups that are still oppressed or still despised 
gain legal and social rights and recognition (though Franke admits her surprise 
that the backlash against same-sex couples has not been greater (9)). However, 
Franke is not suggesting that groups should give up their efforts at law reform: 
“Rights are something we cannot not want” (50).
Many of Franke’s horror stories arise from problems of transition: Former 
slaves were declared married without their knowledge or consent (129-39); 
California “upgraded” the legal status of domestic partnership same-sex 
couples into the equivalent of marriage, often without their knowledge or 
consent (144-50); a judge ruled property acquired long before marriage to be 
part of marital property for a same-sex couple, on the dubious basis that the 
couple would have married earlier if they could have (210-12); and same-sex 
married couples in prior years were unable to divorce because divorce requires 
domiciliary status—while marriage does not—and the state(s) in which the 
couple were domiciled did not recognize same-sex unions (155). Most of these 
are problems associated with transitioning between periods when marriage 
was not available at all, or available only in some places. They should fade 
away for same-sex couples as we move forward, with their right to marriage 
now established across the country.  
One of Franke’s more controversial claims is that the same-sex marriage 
movement succeeded in part because gays managed to displace their stigma 
onto African-Americans (115, 188, 206, 227). This is related to a separate claim 
that gay rights had been portrayed, or had managed to portray itself, as “white” 
(62, 113-14, 198, 205). These are provocative assertions, and obviously hard to 
prove even without space limitations. With a mere handful of paragraphs 
given to the claims in Wedlocked, those not already persuaded are unlikely to 
be won over. 
The book is skeptical about marriage. It portrays marriage as “enduringly 
gendered.”(6). The author views marriage as regulated in a way that reflects 
the circumstances of women historically in a sexist society—as mollified 
only somewhat by recent feminist-inspired law reforms. Franke is equally 
suspicious of government in general: She asks why same-sex couples would 
4. See, e.g., Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d 822 (Va. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1069 
(2008); Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808 (Utah 2007). 
5. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 Harv. C.r.-C.L.L. rev. 393 (1988); Martha Minow, 
Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 Harv. L. rev. 10 (1987); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on 
Sex Equality under Law, 100 YaLe L.J. 1281 (1991).
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“clamor to have the state regulate our romantic lives” (9). She is critical of the 
litigation strategy of those fighting for same-sex marriage, concerned that their 
arguments too often depended on equating state recognition of relationships 
with legitimacy (e.g., 10), and on valuing marriage in a way that denigrated 
nonmarital family forms (113).
Franke is also concerned that gay rights succeeded only by taking the sex 
out of homosexuality (227); that gay advocates moved from asserting a right to 
unconventional sexuality to portraying gays as dignified partners in seemingly 
sexless long-term partnerships (61). She argues that both African-Americans—
both before and after liberation from slavery—and gays—both before and 
after the legal recognition of same-sex marriage—had a variety of romantic, 
marital, and family/kinship forms, all of which were largely suppressed when 
the communities chose, or were forced into, the single form of conventional 
marriage (63-64, 89, 109-10). The same-sex marriage movement is criticized for 
not seeking to build up—and, in fact, denigrating—alternative marital forms 
existing in some states—“civil unions” and “domestic partnerships.” Franke 
observes that it had been central to the litigation strategy to argue that these 
forms were inadequate and demeaning to same-sex couples, and that only 
access to marriage would constitute equal and dignified treatment for such 
couples (107-08). 
Wedlocked advocates recognition and respect for a variety of marriage and 
family forms (223, 231).6 The basic argument is that (many) gay couples have 
different conventions, expectations, and values than do most opposite-sex 
couples—e.g., regarding sexual fidelity during the relationship and financial 
support afterwards (152-53, 215-17). This connects with a slight hope that same-
sex couples might help to transform marriage (214-17, 226)—though on the 
whole, Franke seems to find this unlikely.7 At times, the book’s argument 
appears to be more general: It posits that every couple —same-sex or opposite-
sex—is unique, and should have the right, through premarital agreements, to 
structure the terms of their union as they think best.  
On one hand, it is certainly true that the rights, duties and protections of 
marriage do not fit the interests and needs of all couples equally well. And 
Franke is likely correct that many of the rules relating to marriage come out 
of traditional and sexist views about gender roles, and that many recent 
legal reforms of marriage reflect the general vulnerabilities that traditional 
marriage and traditional gender roles produce. On the other hand, there 
are no obvious, easy solutions to the problem of marriage laws not fitting all 
couples equally well. Proposals along the lines of a variety of marriage/family 
6. See also NaNCY D. PoLikoff, BeYoND StraigHt aND gaY Marriage:  vaLuiNg aLL faMiLieS 
uNDer Law (2008). 
7. Though she does add an appendix specifically on the topic:  “A Progressive Call to Action 
for Married Queers” (233-35).
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forms or individual contracting8—neither idea, of course, is entirely new9—are 
attractive, but there is a concern that the availability of additional options 
simply pushes the problem of vulnerable parties back one step: How can we 
prevent vulnerable parties from being coerced or manipulated into family 
forms that leave them powerless, dependent and impoverished?10 A second 
question: If parties were to have plenary power to determine the financial—and 
nonfinancial—terms of their marriage (cf. 218), then why marry? What would 
marriage mean and what would it add if parties had plenary power to set or 
alter the terms of that status?
Franke is aware of many of these issues, but—unsurprisingly—offers no 
magical solution that will avoid all problems. She recognizes that while any 
set of general rules for marriage will apply too broadly, allowing all parties to 
select their own terms will lead in some cases to exploitation and oppression. 
She recognizes that there will be vulnerable parties—and not all of them will 
be wives in traditional opposite-sex marriages. She notes that judges may 
not be in the best position to evaluate the balance of power in relationships, 
nor to set the limits of tradeoffs between liberty and equality (221). Still, 
not everyone will be persuaded that complete laissez faire would be a better 
alternative. At times, Franke suggests that only those willing to take on all 
the current terms of marriage should marry, as too much strain in seeking to 
enforce unconventional “side deals” could undermine the progress feminists 
have achieved in reforming the rules and terms of marriage (222-23).
Wedlocked is a thoughtful and important reflection on the history of social 
movements, the place of marriage in movements for social reform, and the 
light this history brings to whatever may come next. The book reminds us of 
how new rights can lead to backlash. By the same measure, it reveals how the 
8. Most references to contracting in this context—including in this book—relate to contracting 
before the union —i.e., premarital agreements—to cover the union itself, the consequences 
of its ending, or both. Franke also notes in passing (209) the possibility of just leaving the 
consequences of breakup to negotiation at that time—as contrasted either with contracting in 
advance or the state’s imposition of its own default rules.
9. On the idea of making multiple family forms available, see, e.g., PoLikoff, supra note 6; Larry 
E. Ribstein, A Standard Form Approach to Same-Sex Marriage, 38 CreigHtoN L. rev. 309 (2005) 
(suggesting choice of law and standard business forms approaches to marriage); Brian H. 
Bix, State Interests in Marriage, Interstate Recognition, and Choice of Law, 38 CreigHtoN L. rev. 337, 
344-49 (2005) (same); Shahar Lifshitz, The Pluralistic Vision of Marriage, in Marriage at tHe 
CroSSroaDS 260-84 (Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth S. Scott, eds., 2012) (advocating for a 
variety of state-supported “affiliative institutions”); cf. MartHa aLBertSoN fiNeMaN, tHe 
NeutereD MotHer, tHe SexuaL faMiLY, aND otHer tweNtietH CeNturY trageDieS (1995) 
(arguing for state recognition of the mother-child dyad in the place of recognizing sexual 
unions).
10. These are questions that have long been present in reflections on when and whether to 
enforce premarital and marital agreements. See, e.g., Brian H. Bix, Private Ordering and Family 
Law, 23 J. aMer. aCaD. MatriMoNiaL L. 249 (2010); Brian H. Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of 
Love: Premarital Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 wM. & MarY L. rev. 145 (1998). I 
have also seen the problem from the perspective of drafting proposed legislation in the area, 
this as the Reporter for the Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act.  
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use of the rights against the interests of the right-holders (in this case, marriage 
and liberated African-Americans and gays) can raise its own set of problems.
Similarly, admission to institutions from which a group was previously 
excluded (here, marriage) can be complicated, as the institution can remain 
unfair and constricting. And Wedlocked raises in provocative ways long-standing 
issues regarding whether the state should recognize a range of family forms, 
and whether parties should be able to set the financial and nonfinancial terms 
of their intimate unions. 
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